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Abstract 
A crucial human cognitive goal is to understand and to be understood. But understanding 
often takes active management. Two studies investigated early developmental processes of 
understanding management by focusing on young children’s comprehension monitoring. We 
ask: When and how do young children actively monitor their comprehension of social-
communicative interchanges and so seek to clarify and correct their own potential 
miscomprehension? Study 1 examined the parent-child conversations of 13 children studied 
longitudinally in everyday situations from the time the children were approximately 2 years 
through 3 ½ years. Study 2 used a semi-naturalistic situation in the laboratory to address these 
questions with more precision and control with 36 children aged 2 to 3 ½ years. 
 
 
 
Children’s Early Awareness of Comprehension as Evident in their Spontaneous Corrections of 
Speech Errors 
Social transmission of information is one of the key ways in which both children and 
adults interact and children learn about the world. Potentially, these interactions manifest a 
crucial human cognitive goal: to understand and to be understood. Importantly, understanding 
often requires comprehension management—strategies or attempts to receive further 
information, to be alert for and attempt to correct misunderstandings. In the current research we 
ask: When and how do young children actively monitor their understanding of social-
communicative interchanges in order to manage the social transmission of information and to 
clarify and correct their own potential miscomprehensions? A focus on comprehension 
monitoring and management as reflected in social exchanges of young children is both 
theoretically and methodologically motivated. Methodologically, social attempts to achieve 
comprehension—to understand information from others—are amenable to research with young 
children (who cannot easily reflect on, articulate, or rate their own inner states, such as states of 
comprehension). Theoretically, socially-shaped understanding is developmentally formative—
Vygotsky’s work and contemporary research on “testimony” (Harris 2012) both acknowledge 
the special importance of socially achieved understandings. 
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Two general accounts of early social-cognitive developments are particularly relevant 
here. Csibra and Gergeley (e.g., 2006) have suggested that even infants are sensitive to 
pedagogy, that is, to others trying to teach or tell them something. For Csibra and Gergeley, this 
is the result of an innate set of cues pointing to pedagogical intent; very young children 
automatically utilize social signals, like direct eye contact and contingent, referential 
interactions, that cue them to accept information they receive from an informant (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2011). Alternatively, however, under the heading of “trust in testimony”, Harris and 
others (Gelman, 2009;Harris, 2012) argue that young children are appropriately discriminative. 
They judge only some speakers emitting these cues, and only some information socially 
transmitted via such cues, as trustworthy.  
Only the second of these positions presumes young children engage in active 
comprehension monitoring and management of speakers’ messages. At the same time, the data 
adduced for these two positions typically apply to different ages—in the first case infants, in the 
second case 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old preschoolers. Examination of comprehension monitoring in 
toddlers can help illuminate these positions, their limits, and the nature of this crucial aspect of 
social-cognitive development. Some of these issues were taken up in an older, classic literature 
on comprehension monitoring, but with notable lack of resolution when it came to very early 
development. 
Comprehension Monitoring 
By the time that children are 4 and 5 years old they are well versed in managing 
comprehension in communicative situations, at least in several basic forms, as shown in that 
older literature on “comprehension monitoring.” Currently, comprehension monitoring research 
focuses almost exclusively on text processing in adults (e.g., Shui & Chen, 2013; Weaver, 
Bryant & Burns, 1995) and older elementary school children (e.g., Oakhill, Hart & Samols, 
2005). However, earlier research on younger children’s comprehension monitoring considered 
children’s evaluation of spoken messages via experimental methods designed to elicit explicit 
evaluations, as well as analyses of naturalistic conversations and interactions. Naturalistic studies 
demonstrated that even young toddlers produced the kinds of questions and reactions needed to 
clarify potential comprehension or communicative errors (Gallagher, 1981; Garvey, 1977; 
Spilton & Lee, 1977). Foreshadowing the natural pedagogy versus trust in testimony positions, 
some investigators advanced rich interpretations of such conversational data (as demonstrating 
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valid and frequent comprehension monitoring by very young children), others argued the 
findings deserved only leaner interpretations. Thus, Markman (1981) argued that the youngest 
children did not mentally evaluate their comprehension of messages, but simply commented 
when they were physically unable to comply. 
Many experimental demonstrations seemed to support leaner interpretations for 
preschoolers and even elementary school children because children did not discriminate between 
good (comprehensible, non-ambiguous) messages versus poor ones on judgment tasks involving 
ratings or judgments of various messages (Beal & Flavell 1982; Robinson & Robinson 1977). 
Crucially, however, almost all of the research with preschool children focused on 
referential ambiguity, which occurs when a message has several ambiguous referents--e.g. “Look 
at the horse,” when several horses are in view. Preschoolers generally did not react differently to 
ambiguous and unambiguous messages, simply choosing one of the potential referents, further 
suggesting young children systematically fail to monitor their comprehension. However, the 
overwhelming focus on ambiguity arguably led to an underestimate of preschoolers' monitoring. 
To clarify some of this, Revelle, Wellman and Karabenick (1985) gave preschool 
children several contrasting messages in natural-seeming situations and used children’s 
contingent reactions to assess their comprehension monitoring and management. In the course of 
a play interaction within a room full of carefully composed objects, an adult interspersed the play 
episode with a series of requests, some of which were designed to be difficult for the child to 
understand or to execute. For example, in an unintelligible request the adult said “bring me the 
[yawn]” obscuring the referent’s name; in an impossible request it was “bring me the 
refrigerator” for a real refrigerator that was clearly too big and heavy to move; in an ambiguous 
request it was “bring me the cup” when there were four cups side by side in the room. Children's 
responses to these requests were compared with their responses to control requests that were easy 
to comprehend and comply with (e.g., “bring me the ball” when there was one ball present). 
Three-year-olds exhibited appropriate monitoring responses, for example saying things like 
“what?”, “this one?”, or “can’t hear” for some target messages more than control ones. In 
particular, they did so for unintelligible or impossible messages. Even so, 3-year-olds 
systematically failed to monitor referential ambiguity. Four-year-olds displayed discriminative 
monitoring for all types of problems presented, but even for them referential ambiguity was 
especially difficult. 
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While clarifying the development of comprehension monitoring in part, these studies fail 
to clarify the development of comprehension monitoring in the early formative age ranges that 
naturalistic studies had hoped to address. Several of the studies do, however, validate a method 
that could be used with still younger children, a “reaction method” examining children’s reaction 
to problematic messages in controlled but semi-naturalistic communicative situations. The 
essential idea is that, if/when young children seek understanding (rather than merely action 
success or responding automatically to pedagogical cues), they will monitor their understanding 
and react to attempt to clarify or repair possible misunderstandings. 
The Current Research 
The current research revisits questions about the early development of comprehension 
monitoring. Requests are a limited form of communicative exchange, so in two studies we 
primarily focus on declarative naming, with some comparison to requests as well in Study 2. 
Anomalous requests (“Bring me the refrigerator”) have their parallels in misnamings, deliberate 
or accidental references to X as Y. Children’s reactions to misnamings prove to be a revealing 
way to examine the early development of their comprehension monitoring and management. 
Study 1 
In a preliminary study we examined young children’s reaction to misnamings in naturally 
occurring conversations with adults (mostly their parents). So, we considered conversations like 
this: 
Adult:  That’s a truck. 
Child:  A car. 
One methodological difficulty becomes immediately apparent: did the parent misname here? (Is 
the interchange even about naming, rather than preference or compliance?)  In an experimental 
situation this can be known and controlled (the adult purposefully calls a car a truck), but it is not 
so obvious what an adult-child interchange is about by recourse to conversation alone in 
everyday parent-child exchanges. So, perhaps the child’s reaction above concerns 
comprehension management (“That’s not a truck”), or perhaps it concerns attention management 
(“Not that truck mom, this car”), or other possibilities. We dealt with this interpretive difficulty 
in two ways. In Study 2, we collected experimental data via a reaction method. But in this initial 
study, to gain preliminary insights from naturally occurring parent-child conversations, our 
approach was to seek further clarity by utilizing more extended conversational sequences. Social 
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communicative interchanges intuitively encompass three steps: (a) one person’s initial 
communication (e.g., adult says, “that’s a truck”), (b) a response to that by the listener (e.g., the 
child says, “it’s a car”, possibly remarking on a misnaming), and (c) the initial person’s reaction 
to this response. The third component, (c), can (at times) inform us about the prior ones. For 
example, if the adult says, “Oh you’re right” (in c), that provides evidence that the child was 
catching something like a misnaming in their utterance in (b). In addition, more generally, 
examining adult-child naturally occurring conversations helped inform our generation of a semi-
naturalistic experimental setting and stimuli for Study 2. 
Study 1 examined parent-child conversations for young children studied longitudinally in 
everyday situations from the time the children were approximately 2;0 years through 3;6 years. 
Our focus was instances of apparent adult naming of objects (step a above), and then the further 
steps (b) and (c) of the conversations. 
Method 
Participants 
We examined adult-child conversations from longitudinal transcripts of 13 children from 
the CHILDES database (MacWhinney & Snow, 1990). The CHILDES database contains (among 
other things) samples of children’s everyday conversations with mothers, fathers, siblings, and 
experimenters in everyday situations at home. As outlined in Table 1, the conversations we 
examined were recorded every one, two, or three weeks over several months or years, and for 20 
mins, 30 mins, or 1, 2 or 4 hours per session depending on the child. Also shown in that table is 
the total number of child utterances included in the transcripts we used. As can be seen, the 
varying sampling intervals and sessions plus the varying verbosity of the children meant that 
children provided widely different numbers of utterances for further coding. 
These 13 children were selected from the larger CHILDES database because their 
transcripts included the age range from 2 years to 3 years and 6 months; each had at least 50 
conversations matching our search criteria (see below, but in essence we searched for 
conversations that included adults’ naming statements); the transcripts were recorded in 
naturalistic settings rather than structured tasks (e.g., story book reading tasks). These transcripts 
were of audio recordings and thus provide no information about nonverbal responses, such as 
where the parties were looking or (possibly) pointing when they made their utterances. 
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As shown in Table 1, these children vary on gender (9 boys and 4 girls), ethnicity (one 
African American), and family social economic status (children from academic, nonacademic, 
middle-class or working-class families). But they do so unsystematically. 
Procedure 
The 13 children’s transcripts that matched the age range of 2;0-3;6 were searched for all 
adults’ utterances containing the following target phrases intended to capture simple cases of adult 
(mostly parent) object naming: 1) “it’s a __”, 2) “that’s a __”, 3) “these are __”, 4) “those are __”, 
5) “this is a __”.  This yielded 2782 utterances for initial consideration.  These target phrases do 
not, of course, capture all instances of parental naming but capture many.  Further, identifying 
utterances using those phrases includes parental talk that is not object naming (e.g. “that’s a good 
idea” referring to non-objects; “that’s a pretty box” referring to an attribute of an object not its 
name). All statements that were not clear-cut instances of object naming (e.g., “that’s a good 
idea”) were excluded from further analysis. Adult utterances that were interrupted, unintelligible, 
or directed to another person (not to target child) were likewise excluded.  
Phrases that were repeated in a same conversational turn were coded only once. The final 
sample consisted of 1707 adult statements followed by a child response and then a further adult 
response; these varied by parent-child pair as shown in Table 1.   
Coding 
After being identified by computer search as containing the target adult phrases, each 
candidate conversational sequence was coded only if it minimally contained two steps: the initial 
adult naming statement (step a above) and the child’s response (step b). If the child (in step b) 
disagreed with the adult statement or questioned the name, the adult’s reaction to the child’s 
response was also coded in a third step (c). All coding was conducted by examining each 
conversation within four utterances before the first step and the four utterances after the third step, 
and still more utterances as needed, to allow the coders to understand the conversational context. 
Adult statements. The adult statements were initially coded into one of the five types of 
naming phrases mentioned above. Inspection showed that patterns of child response were 
essentially the same for all these adult naming phrases, so analyses collapsed all these variations 
in a simple category of an adult naming. 
Child responses. The child’s responses to the adult’s naming were initially coded into 
one of several categories including: (1) the child disagrees with the adult name (e.g., mom says 
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“it’s a truck,” child says “no” or “it’s a car”), (2) child asks a name-related question for 
confirmation (e.g., a doubtful question: “a truck?”), (3) child agrees with the adult’s name (by 
saying “yes” or repeating the name, etc.), (4) the child provides a follow-up statement or asks a 
follow-up question, apparently agreeing with the name (e.g., “that’s a nice truck”, “is that a 
dump truck?”), and (5) other, including the child provides no response or switches to a new 
topic, or provides an uncodable response (e.g., “la la”). For analyses we collapsed 1 and 2 as 
indicating disagreements and 3 and 4 as indicating agreement with the adult’s name. The purpose 
of the initially extensive categories was to help coders have a comprehensive list of all possible 
responses to aid reliability. 
Adult reactions. The adult’s reaction to the child’s response was coded into one of 
several categories (and sub-categories) that followed up (or failed to follow up) on the child’s 
response, given that the child’s response in step-b was coded as a 1, 2, 3 or 4 as outlined above 
(in essence the child either agreed or disagreed with the adult’s naming in step-a). Given our 
focus on child reaction to potential misnamings, our coding here had only three categories: (1) 
Confirmed-misname—adult’s response confirmed the child had apparently detected a misnaming 
at least from the child’s point of view, including adopting the child’s name (e.g., “oh, a car”), (2) 
Following up the child’s name in a question (“you think that’s a car?) or statement (“a really big 
car”), (3) Restated-name (“that’s a truck”, “no, truck”), or Other (changing the topic, no 
response, etc.). 
Reliability 
Inter-coder reliability was assessed using randomly selected samples of 20% of the total 
conversations, but taken from the 4 children with the largest number. Two reliability coders from 
a pool of three coders independently coded each reliability sample. For all codes, there was 92%-
99% agreement, with Kappas ranging from .62 to .98. All of the Kappas fall within “substantial” 
(.61-.80) levels of inter-rater reliability, and 71% of them fall within “near perfect” (.81 and 
above) levels (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Results 
Overall, mothers were the adult speakers in 58.2% of these conversations, in 10.2% it 
was fathers, and 31.5% of the time it was some other non-parental adult. Descriptively, within 
the 2782 conversations (see Table 1) that used the adult target phrases, 1707 conversations or 
61.4% were judged to include instances of adult object naming. The frequencies ranged from 50 
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for the adult-child pair contributing the fewest instances to the sample (1.8%of the total) to 726 
for a different pair who contributed the most (26.1%). To reiterate these figures inevitably miss 
some instances of adult naming but include a large sample (1707) for analyses. 
In 829 conversations (or 48.6% of the time), the child’s response was a 3 or 4 as outlined 
in the description of coding; that is, essentially the child directly or indirectly agreed with the 
adult’s name. In 733 conversations (42.9% of the time), the child made no response or changed 
the topic. Yet in 145 conversations (8.5% of the time), the child provided a reaction potentially 
indicating detection of a misnaming, a response coded as a 1 or a 2. All children except one child 
did so on at least 6% of the adult namings they received (range from 6.2% to 25%; M = 9.4%, 
SD = 6.2%). Critically, for 32.4% of these instances of potential misnaming, the adult’s further 
reaction seemed to confirm that a misnaming had been detected by the child (at least from the 
child’s point of view). That is, the adult agreed with or accepted the child’s alternative name. 
Child age did not correlate with the proportion of children’s awareness of potential 
misnamings (% occurrences of categories 1, disagree, and 2, question for confirmation, 
combined  for each child)—r (137)= -.09, p= .31—nor did it do so for detected misnamings 
confirmed by subsequent adult response—r (68)= -.15, p = .21. That is, misnaming detection 
occurred even in the children’s youngest transcripts. 
Discussion 
As expected (from the nature of human fallibility alone), adults do misname objects for 
their young children. More focally, even children who have just attained their second birthdays at 
times detect these misnamings and attempt to correct them. 
Naturalistic recordings of children’s communicative interactions however do not allow 
control of the exchanges surrounding the child's reactions, and so cannot tell us if such 
comprehension monitoring is frequent or extremely rare, just that it exists as early as in 
toddlerhood. In this and other ways, naturally occurring conversations are difficult to rigorously 
interpret. For example, they are unlikely to include closely contrasting objects X and Y, or 
closely contrasting situations for comparison, or unlikely to provide evidence that the child 
actually knew (or did not know) the named object. Moreover, perhaps (and sometimes, surely) 
the adult (e.g., parent) in some way prompts the child to make his/her reactions. And, of course, 
with only 47 misnamings plausibly confirmed by the adult, we were unable to look deeply into 
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young children’s comprehension monitoring or management. Experimental control of situations 
and names are needed to overcome these interpretive difficulties. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we experimentally contrasted correct and incorrect namings provided to young 
children and examined their reactions. One set of four studies by Koenig and Echols (2003) with 
infants sets the stage for this endeavor. Koenig and Echols examined how 16-month-olds reacted 
to either true or false labeling of common objects. Primarily, they observed infants’ gaze to 
attempt to shed light on whether the infants understood that fundamental mislabeling might have 
occurred. Their initial, basic finding (their Study 1) revealed that infants presented with false 
labeling looked significantly longer to the human speaker (rather than the object labeled) than 
did infants who were presented with correct labeling statements, suggesting that infants were 
detecting false labels. In three subsequent studies they found that infants did not exhibit this 
pattern if the labels emanated from an audio speaker (not a person) or if the person saying the 
label was turned away from the objects and looking elsewhere. At the least, these data show that 
even for such young children, naming (and misnaming) is of interest for the case of an 
intentional speaker apparently labeling deliberately. 
At the same time, from infant looking alone (e.g., looking to an attentive human labeler 
for misnamings, but looking to the object for correct namings), it is not clear that children did 
much more than simply notice a discrepancy between the name spoken and their own name for 
the object. A name-object discrepancy, given that it was delivered by an attentive, “pedagogical” 
adult (and not a recording machine or an adult not even looking at the object or child), in itself 
might have elicited looking to the speaker, with or without the child sensing the name was 
communicatively incorrect. Intriguingly, in a final analysis conducted across all their four 
studies, Koenig and Echols (2003) report that some of these infants did at times verbally 
comment on the objects and names. Of the 64 infants who heard correct namings (12 correct 
namings each in that between-subjects condition) across the four studies, 29 (45%) said a name 
themselves on at least one of their 12 trials, and all of these repeated the object name used by the 
adult—consistent with both what the infant saw and what they heard. For the 64 who heard 
misnamings, however, 33 (52%) produced at least one label on at least one of their 12 trials, and 
31 of these “correctively labeled,” stating the correct rather than false name for the focal object 
at least once. These suggestive corrections point to studies with slightly older children who can 
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talk (and thus have the ability to say conversationally, in some fashion, that the name was wrong 
or to query the speaker about what they meant) in order to better reveal young children’s 
emerging comprehension monitoring and management. 
In Study 2 we used a semi-naturalistic situation in the laboratory to examine young 
children’s comprehension management reactions. We included children from 2 to 3+ years, both 
to fill in a gap in the literature (examining toddlers who are in between the infants and 
preschoolers studied in other research) and to clarify the initial verbal data provided by Koenig 
and Echols (albeit in our case with young toddlers rather than old infants). Primarily we focused 
on naming events—naming and misnaming. 
To be clear, our focus is not language acquisition but social cognition: Understanding 
misnaming involves knowing not only that a word failed to label an object, but that a person also 
failed to refer correctly to that object. Further, to achieve increased clarity requires commenting 
on, questioning, or otherwise managing the misnaming. For comparison purposes (and to begin 
to extend the Revelle, et al., 1985, data to younger children) we also included some carefully 
targeted adult requests for objects—straightforward requests and, focally, anomalous requests. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-six normally developing children (17 males) ages 2 to 3.5 years old participated 
(M age=31 months, range 25-41 months). Children came from a small mid-western university 
city and surrounding smaller towns where most families were middle class. By parental report, 
32 children were Caucasian and 4 were African-American, multiracial, Latino, or Asian. All 
children spoke English as their only language or fluently as one of two languages. By parental 
report, 17% of mothers were occupied caring for children and families at home; 47% were from 
families of professionals (doctors, lawyers, teachers, researchers), and 10% from blue-collar 
families.  
Children and parents were contacted because they were on a potential-participant list 
obtained initially from birth records at one of the area’s two primary birthing hospitals. They 
agreed to come to a university lab for the study, where the parent received free parking and $10, 
regardless of if they then consented to have their child participate (100% of those that came to 
the lab consented to participation). The data were collected between May 2015 and January 
2016. 
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Procedures 
After consenting to participate at the lab, parents (mothers, with a rare father as an 
exception) received a vocabulary checklist to report their child’s familiarity with different words. 
Then child and parent were brought to a small room where various toys and objects were 
arranged on two toddler-size tables. Parents were seated doing paperwork in the corner of the 
room to help ensure the child’s comfort. Parents were told they could encourage their child to 
play with the toys, but not to name any toys or objects specifically. Once the child engaged in 
play comfortably, the adult experimenter followed a script for the misnaming of some objects 
and correct naming of others, as well as several anomalous and straightforward requests. For 
namings and misnamings the adult got the child’s attention, pointed to or held an object and said 
“this is a X.” For requests, she got the child’s attention and said the request. Target items (named 
and misnamed, straightforward and anomalous) were mentioned using a neutral voice and a 
neutral expression. All children received the same target items but in one of two different orders 
with the specific order for each child randomly assigned before the start of the session. 
Besides the target items, the child and adult experimenter interacted with the various 
other objects and with each other in a natural-seeming adult-child play interaction. Sessions 
lasted approximately 10 minutes and were videotaped throughout. Except for the target items, 
the total amount of adult-child talk, and topics talked of, could vary per child depending on each 
child’s interests, temperament, etc. Within these adult-child interactions, four examples of 
“misnaming” and seven examples of correct naming were presented to the child more or less 
evenly spaced throughout the 10-minute session with the aim of helping the session seem normal 
and not generally odd or peculiar. The objects for naming were a small ball, book, cup, doll, 
spoon, shoe, toy car, dog, cat and frog. After each of the four target misnamings, and after giving 
the child time to spontaneously react and comment, the adult proceeded to ask “Is that right, is 
that (e.g.) a dog?” to potentially supplement the child’s on-line reactions. 
In the course of the interactions the adult provided a modicum of ordinary requests and 
directives to the child (e.g. “you sit here,” “look at this,” “leave your shoes on,” etc.). The child 
also received six (or sometimes five) scripted requests directed to an array of objects in the room. 
For example, “Bring me the car.” Of these, four were anomalous requests: “Bring me the toma” 
(unknown object); “Bring me the *cough*” (inaudible); and two impossible items, “Bring me the 
towel“ (which was surreptitiously tacked to the table), and “Bring me the clock” (which was 
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attached to the wall above the child’s reach). Straightforward request objects were a car and a 
book, readily available among the toys on one of the two tables. 
Measures 
The sessions were coded from the videos separately by the adult experimenter and a 
research assistant. Inter-rater reliability, established on approximately half the subjects, was 
90.6%. Once inter-rater reliability was established, the two coders each coded essentially half of 
the remaining videos separately. 
Misnaming. The child’s responses to each of the experimenter’s misnaming and correct 
naming statements were coded based on the global coding system outlined in Table 2. As one 
example, for the Misnaming condition, for a child’s response to be coded as a “corrective,” the 
child had to correct the adult and provide the appropriate name for the misnamed object, or give 
the experimenter the correct object, which would be located on the tables with toys. Thus an 
illustrative “corrective” response would be if the child said “Not a dog. It’s a frog” when the 
experimenter pointed to and misnamed the frog as a “dog,” or if the child brought the 
experimenter the toy dog. 
Table 2 also outlines the coded responses for Correct Names. Focally, for example, a 
child’s response would be coded as “agree” if the adult correctly says “That’s a spoon” when 
holding a spoon, and the child responded “Yes” or repeated the name, such as saying “spoon.”  
In principle, just as in misnaming a child could disagree or provide a corrective for correct 
namings too. Or they could agree with a misnaming (e.g., repeating or saying yes to a misname) 
just as for a correct naming. 
For the purpose of analysis, we termed “corrective”, “disagree”, and “what/ask?” 
responses for the Misname condition as “appropriate to misnaming” responses, responses that 
indicated the child detected the misname and thus was monitoring his/her comprehension. For 
comparison we tallied the same three responses—corrective, disagree, and what/ask?—as 
“appropriate to misnaming” responses for the Correct Names too, although they were of course 
not appropriate for a correct name. Thus, we compared these same two categories of response 
(those composing “appropriate for misnaming”) across the two conditions. 
Anomalous requests. Table 2 also displays the coding categories utilized for the requests. 
In order to be conservative, for the anomalous requests only responses of either “unable” or 
“asking,” were considered “appropriate to anomalous requests” for our analyses. And for 
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comparison, these same responses were scored as “appropriate to anomalous requests” for the 
control, comparison items as well. 
Results 
Misnaming. Figure 1 outlines the focal data. For the Misnamed target objects, 118 of 143 
(83%) of the children’s responses were either “corrective,” “disagree,” or “what/ask?”; that is, 
they appropriately detected and commented on the misnaming. Of course, children might, for 
whatever reasons, provide many of the same sorts of reactions to ordinary correctly named 
objects. For the correctly named control items, however, only 15 of 242 items (6%) received the 
response appropriate for a misnamed object. Instead of correcting or denying the correctly named 
objects, children agreed with the name, repeated the name the adult provided, or often (138, or 
57% of the time) did nothing but continued with the play interaction. 
Statistical tests of these data were straightforward. A t-test comparing “appropriate to 
misnaming” reactions for the misnamed versus correctly named target objects was t(35)=17.96, 
p<.0001, d=3.98, 95% CIs [.68, .85]. Non-parametrically, all 36 children provided at least one 
reaction appropriate to the misnamed items. In contrast only 7 children ever did so for the 
correctly named items (four children doing so on only one of the seven correctly named objects). 
This contrast was significant: χ2
After each naming item children were asked, “Is that right; is it an X?” Often children did 
not respond to the question, but 63.6% of the time for misnamed items children asserted it was 
not. This occurred on only 8.3% of correct namings—t(35)=7.90, p<.0001. Moreover, for 
correctly named items, 46.7% of the time children asserted that “yes” what the adult said was 
right. This occurred only 1.3% of the time for misnamings. 
 (1)=27.03, p<.0001. Age made little difference to this 
appropriate responding: the older half of our children responded appropriately to 90% of the 
misnamed items and the younger half responded appropriately to 75%. 
The “appropriate to misnaming” data in Figure 1 include essentially children’s 
spontaneous “correctives,” “disagrees,” or “whats?” in the 3-4 seconds after the misnaming (or 
correct naming) occurred. A few children who did nothing in that interval but said “no” to the “Is 
that right?” question that then followed were also included as disagreeing and thus they were 
credited as responding “appropriate to misnaming.”  Nine children’s disagrees were of this form 
for one or two of their four misnaming trials, and one child’s only disagrees came in response to 
that question (on 3 of his 4 misnamed items). These inclusions had only a minor effect on the 
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data. When those responses are removed, then the “appropriate to misnaming” data shown in 
Figure 1, declines from 83% to 75%. A t-test comparing “appropriate to misnaming” reactions 
for the misnamed versus correctly named target objects remains highly significant, t(35)=13.55,  
p<.0001, d=3.03, 95% CIs [.58, .79]. With this re-scoring, 35 of 36 children provided at least one 
reaction appropriate to the misnamed items. In contrast only 7 children ever did so for the 
correctly named items: χ2
In addition to verbal responses—“correctives”, “disagrees”, and “whats?”—children 
could respond to the misnaming event with gestures or actions that would be appropriate. Here 
we coded from the videotapes two actions that seemed particularly appropriate and were easy to 
code when definitely exhibited: Shaking the head “no” to disagree with the misnaming (“shakes 
head”), and “looks around” (as if to search for the labeled object instead of the one actually 
referred to). Of the 118 responses tallied as appropriate to misnaming for the Misnamed items (as 
shown in Figure 1) there were 19 that included these definite gestures (16.1% of those 118); 12 
were “shakes head” and 7 were “looks around.” Only 4 such responses (all “looks around”) were 
given without some accompanying “appropriate to misnaming” verbalization. In short, at this 
age, the vast majority of children’s appropriate responding was verbal (83%) or included a verbal 
comment (96.6%). 
 (1)=26.04, p<.0001. 
We chose objects to name for which other research (e.g., research with the McArthur 
CDI) has shown that children know the names. But we also asked parents to report for their child 
on a parent checklist. As expected, parents reported that their children knew the names of the 
items 96.9% of the time. 
Anomalous requests. For the anomalous requests, 54 of the 144 responses (38%) were 
either “unable” or “asking,” that is “appropriate to anomalous requests.” In contrast, for the 
straightforward requests most children (40 out of 55 requests) brought the object and only one 
said “no” (noncomply in Table 2) with that response conservatively plotted as “appropriate to 
anomalous request” in Figure 1. A paired samples t-test of these request data yielded, t(35)=6.27, 
p<.0001, d=1.55, 95% CIs [.24, .48]. Additionally, for 28 of the anomalous requests (19.4%) 
children brought an alternative object to the one requested, this occurred only once for 
straightforward requests. 
Two anomalous request items were specially constructed to be able to address suspicions 
like that of Markman (1981) that young children process requests simply by attempting to fulfill 
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them and only comment if they are unable (engaging in action monitoring instead of 
comprehension monitoring). This cannot account for 3- and 4-year-olds responses in Revelle et 
al. (1985), but potentially could account for the responses of the younger children examined in 
Study 2. For the towel request (where the towel was surreptitiously tacked to the table) children 
could only appropriately comment on their inability (and thus the anomalousness of the request) 
after trying to bring it. For the clock item (where the clock was high on the wall), however, 
children could monitor and comment ahead of any attempt to retrieve it. Thus for these items we 
closely examined the timing of children’s comments and actions: 17 children commented by 
questioning the request (“ e.g., clock?”) or verbally refusing (“no”) before trying (pantomiming 
trying) to reach the clock; only 6 questioned or verbally refused the request to bring the towel 
before attempting to bring it and finding it couldn’t be moved: binomial test, z=3.04, p<.003. In 
other words, on average these young children were monitoring their comprehension (not simply 
reacting to failed actions) for the clock requests, and presumably for others as well. 
Discussion 
These results straightforwardly demonstrate that children as young as 2 years have an 
understanding of the appropriate naming of objects and, more focally, monitor the speech of 
others to detect and correct misnamings. As demonstrated in the high percentage (83%, see 
Figure 1) of “corrective,” “disagree,” and “what?” responses for misnaming, the children freely 
expressed that they understood a speaker had misnamed an object. Note that children were not 
just responding indiscriminately, because despite equal opportunities to do so children rarely 
“corrected” or “disagreed” when they received a correct name. In total, very young children have 
begun to monitor and manage their comprehension in the case of naming of common objects. 
A priori it could be argued that children’s comprehension monitoring abilities might be 
first developed and revealed in their reaction to misnaming, because young children are so busy 
learning names for objects. However, we provide evidence that they monitor and manage their 
comprehension for simple requests as well. Using reactions methods similar to ours with still 
younger children might show an advantage for naming over requesting, but might not. Some 
have argued that with regard to children’s own productions, proto-imperative points precede pro-
to-declarative ones. But this is contentious, and regardless there is no good reason to suspect that 
such production data would parallel comprehension data in this realm. Figure 1 might give the 
impression that children are more likely to spot misnamings than anomalous requests, but a 
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convincing argument to that effect is not possible given our data, because of the many 
differences in the utterances themselves and the response demands for children in reacting 
appropriately as we have defined such reactions. What can be said confidently, given the variety 
of objects, names, and requests we used, as well as the variety of reactions we coded, is that very 
young children monitor and manage their comprehension in an impressive variety of 
conversational ways. 
Our method in this study was importantly quasi-experimental—using carefully created 
experimental contrasts—but also naturalistic in that these contrasts were embedded within 
natural situations that provoke everyday reactions. Experimental methods, such as those for 
examining understanding in adults and older children, also carefully contrast several conditions 
but typically measure cognitive preferences by directly asking for explicit evaluations using 
ratings or forced-choice tasks (e.g., a passage rated as “good” or “bad”, or an explanation rated 
for “simplicity”). While preschool and elementary school children can be tested with such 
methods, very young children fail to validly employ such explicit evaluations and ratings. In our 
own data, when children were explicitly asked if what the adult had said was right (e.g., “that’s a 
dog”) children asserted it was correct for only 47% of the correctly named items. Appropriately, 
this was significantly more than they ever asserted a false name was correct (which occurred 
only 1% of the time), but nonetheless shows how often young children can fail to respond to 
even such straightforward requests for an explicit judgment. At the same time, children’s 
reactive responding was clearly more explicitly informative than the simple eye gaze measures 
used with infants. Other examples of what we have termed “reactive methods” used with very 
young children (to address other questions) include those by Kemler Nelson, Egan and Holt 
(2004), Meltzoff, Waismeyer and Gopnik (2012), and Grosse et al. (2010). 
General Discussion 
Using naturalistic (Study 1) and controlled quasi-naturalistic (Study 2) methods we 
demonstrate that very young children who have just attained their second birthdays detect 
communicative breakdowns of understanding and attempt to correct them. These data establish a 
very early emergence of abilities and proclivities to actively monitor and manage one’s 
comprehension, and Study 2 establishes a method for measuring those abilities in very young 
children.  
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 Recall the two general accounts of early social-cognitive developments outlined in the 
introduction: (1) Very young children automatically utilize social signals, like direct eye contact 
and contingent, referential interactions, to accept the information they receive from an informant 
because those provide innate cues pointing to pedagogical intent (Csibra & Gergely, 2011). (2) 
Alternatively, however, young children are appropriately discriminative at least by the ages 
studied via “trust in testimony” paradigms (Harris 2012). The second position but not the first 
presumes young children engage in active comprehension monitoring and management of 
speakers’ messages. Our findings support the second overall account and do so by bridging the 
gap in ages manifest across most earlier studies whereby the natural pedagogy studies typically 
research infants and the “trust“ studies typically research 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds.  
Establishing the early emergence of abilities and proclivities to actively monitor and 
manage one’s comprehension is an important step, but, the details of that early emergence and its 
importance in children’s further cognitive growth remain to be explored. For example, what 
about still younger children, infants?  Consider further the Koenig and Echols (2003) research 
with 16-month olds, where they post hoc examined children’s spontaneous comments. While 
overall children were as likely to say a name in the true naming and false naming conditions 
(45% and 52% of infants did so at least once across the 12 namings they heard), in their Study 1 
where children saw a live adult look at and label (or mis-label) the objects, 15 of 16 children’s 
spontaneously correctly named the object (again at least once over 12 trials). Although these data 
are notably sparser, and corrective naming much less frequent than in ours, their methods were 
also arguably less naturalistic and less child-friendly than our free play based method. In this 
way their data suggest that our methods could be extended to still younger children to good 
effect. Doing so might help reveal the earliest emergence of such comprehension monitoring and 
management. 
Relatedly, we unexpectedly found no strong evidence of developmental change within 
toddlerhood. Both the youngest children and those a year and a half older routinely monitored 
and managed their understanding in these social-communicative situations. Given the impressive 
performance of children only 24 months of age, this too suggests that future research could 
potentially use our methods with still younger children. 
Additionally, it now seems timely to ask: How frequently and widely do very young 
children monitor and attempt to manage their comprehension of the communicative information 
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that surrounds them? In advance of further research, we suspect that young children do so in a 
wider set of circumstances for a wider variety of miscommunications than we deployed. One 
prior study that used a reaction method and provides data on children’s spontaneous corrections 
of false namings sheds light on this issue. 
In a complex study designed to examine children’s use of negation, Pea (1982) presented 
children numerous sentences that included true and false namings. Half of these were namings of 
the sort we used but half were hybrid naming-plus-requests (e.g., “show me the ball” while the 
experimenter pointed directly to a car). In Pea’s test situation the adult and child sat across from 
each other at a table and the adult pointed and then labeled 48 items one-by-one. Given the 
testing situation and total number of sentences, children often failed to respond at all; indeed 18-
month-olds failed to respond on 54% of their sentences, making their data essentially 
uninterpretable. The 30 children aged 24 to 40 months, however, responded in some form or 
another on 84% of their trials, and they provided an explicit negation (e.g. “no,” or more 
complexly “that’s not a ball”) on 49% of their misnamed items. In contrast, they provided an 
explicit negation on only 5% of the correct-naming items they received. Clearly, Pea’s situation 
was more demanding and less child-friendly than ours, and his measure of verbal negation 
narrower than our measure of explicit disagreement. Thus as shown in Figure 1, our young 
children appropriately responded to misnamings on more than 80% of their trials. Nonetheless, if 
construed as indicating comprehension monitoring (rather than just logical negation), his data 
also show that very young children are monitoring and managing their comprehension. Indeed, 
they do so in his case even when the circumstances are relatively more challenging and less 
engaging than in ours. 
Findings from somewhat older children’s “trust in testimony” (e.g. Harris 2012) show 
that young children are monitoring and reacting to the accuracy of speakers in several additional 
fashions. In particular, 3-and 4-year-old children track speakers who have been consistently 
accurate or consistently inaccurate for several prior namings and then differentially learn new 
names from the former not the latter. These data show that by the time they are preschoolers 
children not only monitor and manage their own comprehension, they use that monitoring to 
manage further learning. Only a few recent studies have begun to assess if speaker accuracy 
influences the word learning of still younger children, infants and toddlers (Brooker & Poulin-
Dubois 2013; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Krogh-Jesperson & Echols, 2012). Koenig and 
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Woodward’s (2010) series of three studies exemplifies what has been found. In that research 24-
month-olds interacted with either an adult who first labeled three common objects accurately or 
instead inaccurately. Then that speaker trained and tested children’s learning of a new word-
object link. The training and test involved both provision of a word for a novel object (“first 
label”) or a new label for a familiar object (“second label,” because the child already knew one 
name for the object). These young children learned novel object names (“first label”) equally 
from both accurate and inaccurate speakers (learning the label for the novel object about 70-80% 
of the time in both cases). However, they often attenuated their learning of “second labels” from 
speakers who were inaccurate on the earlier common object names. They still learned those new 
“second labels” from the inaccurate labellers (50-60% of the time) but this was typically less 
than the percentage of time they learned “second labels” from the accurate labellers. (However, 
this first versus second label difference only appears in some studies not others; see e.g., Brooker 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2013). 
Future studies would do well to examine additional factors that could illuminate the 
development of comprehension monitoring across early childhood and beyond.  Gesture could 
potentially be one such factor. The fact that gesture doesn’t add anything to children’s 
monitoring of comprehension in our data is interesting. It might be a more important factor for 
still younger children, however, whose verbal competences are still more limited than those of 2-
year-olds. Such a trend would help illuminate the contribution of increasing language skill—
which develops notably in the preschool years—to the development of early comprehension 
monitoring and management. Perhaps one developmental trend would be a diminution of the use 
of gesture in situations presenting comprehension anomalies. At the same time, however, gesture 
is known to provide an indicator of comprehension struggles in still older children as well as 
provide a mechanism for developmental change (see the work of Goldin-Meadow, 2015). 
Executive functioning is another factor that itself develops and given its extended 
developmental trajectory could contribute to the development of comprehension management 
skills in early development and beyond. With regard to early development specifically, between 
the ages of 3 and 5 years, children show dramatic improvement in the use of executive control to 
achieve cognitive, emotional, and action goals (Diamond, 2013). Executive functioning often 
involves overriding a dominant response tendency and it is plausible that detecting 
inconsistencies between what is known and what someone else says requires just this; that is, 
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active comprehension monitoring (as opposed to automatic responding to pedagogical cues) 
seems to require one to inhibit a default tendency to accept information as true and coherent. 
Intriguingly, children with lower levels of inhibitory control have difficulty ignoring misleading 
testimony (Jaswal Perez-Edgar, Kondrad, Palmquist, Cole, et al., 2014.)  And recent research by 
Doebel, Rowell & Koenig (2016) shows that detecting simple logical inconsistencies in 
speakers’ statements (e.g. “ I saw a ball today that was the biggest ball ever; it was the smallest 
ball ever”) improved from 3 to 5 years. Moreover, executive function (plus working memory) 
predicted inconsistency detection. By hypothesis, executive functions could help shape and 
predict further developments in comprehension monitoring as well, and our results set the stage 
for such future research. 
Much remains to be known about how young children track the accuracy of speakers over 
time and how that may influence their learning. Given our findings, several questions are now 
ripe for systematic investigation. These include, at the least, (a) when and in what circumstances 
very young children’s comprehension monitoring originates, (b) whether and when very young 
children’s comprehension monitoring is deployed in the service of actively managing learning, 
(c) how early comprehension monitoring expands and develops and (d) what factors predict and 
shape its early origins plus its extended development. 
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Table 1.  Subject and Sample Descriptions 
 
 
Child 
 
 
Contributor 
 
 
Collected Procedure 
 
# of 
Transcripts 
 
Age 
Range 
 
 
Demographics 
1:1  
Conversation 
Partner 
 
# of Total 
Conversations 
 
# (%) of Valid 
Conversations 
Abe Kuczaj (1977) 0.5 or 1hr a week 105 2;4-3;5 White male; 
graduate student 
family 
Mother, Father 185 97(52.4%) 
Adam Brown (1973) 1 or 2hrs every 2 weeks 32 2;3-3;5 African-American 
male; middle class 
Mother, 
Researcher 
285 213(74.7%) 
Jillian Weist (2008) 0.5hr every 2 weeks 22 2;1-2;10 White Female; 
middle class 
professional 
Mother, 
Researcher 
90 41(45.6%) 
Jimmy Demetras 
(1987)  
20 mins every 2 weeks 26 2;2-2;9 White male; 
working class 
Mother, Father 50 33(66.0%) 
Matty Weist (2008) 0.5hr every 2 weeks 27 2;3-3;5 White male; middle 
class professional 
Mother 133 61(45.9%) 
Naomi Sachs (1983) Multiple short episodes 
every 2 weeks 
55 2;0-3;5 White female; 
college professor 
family 
Mother 72 50(69.4%) 
Nina Suppes (1974) 
 
1hr every week 49 2;0-3;3 White female: 
middle class 
professional 
Mother 726 468(64.5%) 
Peter Bloom, Hood, 
& Lightbown 
4hrs every 3 weeks 15 2;0-3;1 White male; upper 
middle class 
Mother, Father, 
Researcher 
429 249(58.0%) Au
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(1974) 
Roman Weist (2008) 0.5hr every 2 weeks 24 2;2-3;5 White male; middle 
class professional 
Researcher 51 40(78.4%) 
Ross MacWhinney 
(1995) 
Multiple short episodes 
every 2-3 weeks 
81 2;4-3;5 White male; college 
professor family 
Researcher 101 47(46.5%) 
Sarah Brown (1973) 0.5hr once or twice a 
week 
63 2;3-3;5 White female; 
working class 
Mother 212 128(60.4%) 
Shem Clark (1979) 1hr once a week 47 2;2-3;2 White male; middle 
to upper middle 
class 
Mother, 
Researcher 
368 244(66.3%) 
Trevor Demetras 
(1987) 
Multiple short episodes 
a month every 2-3 
months 
21 2;0-3;3 White male; 
working class 
Father 80 36(45.0%) 
Total: 13 children, 2782 utterances; among these, 61.4% (1707 utterances) were coded for steps 2 and possibly 3 and so included in further analyses 
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Table 2 
Child Response to a Misname 
Response Category Examples 
1. Corrective Says “That’s not a _____. That’s a ____.” 
2. Disagree Says “No.” 
3. Agree Says “Yes,” “Dog” (repeating adult label) 
4. What/Ask Says “What?” or “Huh?” 
5. Nothing/Ignore Does not acknowledge name 
Child Response to a Correct Name 
Response Category Examples 
1. Agree Says, e.g. “Yes,” “Frog,” “Ribbit Ribbit” 
2. Disagree Says “No.” 
3. Corrective Says “That’s not a _____. That’s a ____.” 
4. What/Ask Says “What?” or “Huh?” 
5. Nothing/Ignore Does not acknowledge name 
Child Response to an Anomalous Request 
Response Category Examples 
1. Unable Expresses inability: “High” or “It’s stuck” 
2. Noncomply Says “no” to request  
3. Alternative Brings other object 
4. Asking/What Says “What?” “This?” “Dog?” 
5. Nothing/Ignore Does not acknowledge request 
Child Response to a Normal Request 
Response Category Examples 
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1. Comply Brings object 
2. Noncomply Says “no” to request 
3. Alternative Brings other object 
4. Asking/What Says “What?” “This?” “Dog?” 
5. Nothing/Ignore Does not acknowledge request 
 
 
Figure 1 
Legend: Percentage of child responses to correct versus misnaming utterances and to 
straightforward versus anomalous requests. “Appropriate” responses mean responses appropriate 
to misnamings for the two naming conditions, and mean responses appropriate to ananomalous 
requests for the request conditions, as detailed in the text. 
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